Abstract: This paper presents new estimates of annual U.S. production of pig iron dating back to 1827. These estimates are used to assess the vulnerability of the antebellum iron industry to foreign competition and the role of the tariff in fostering the industry's early development. Domestic pig iron production is found to be highly sensitive to changes in import prices.
Introduction
The role of import tariffs in promoting the growth of U.S. manufacturing in the antebellum period remains a highly contested question. American manufacturers of the period are usually portrayed either as fledgling newcomers that could not have survived without protection from foreign competition, or as heartier enterprises whose success did not depend upon tariffs but on tailoring their products to the particular circumstances of the domestic market.
Both contemporary observers and economic historians have debated which perspective is a more accurate portrait of early American manufacturing. 1 The vulnerability of the antebellum iron industry to foreign competition has been particularly controversial. Writing in the late 1840s, Henry Carey (1872, p. 83) argued that should the United States have "perfect freedom of trade . . . the result would be the stoppage of every [iron] furnace in the Union." By contrast, Frank Taussig (1931, p. 135) believed that "there is no reason to doubt that, had there been no duty at all, there would yet have been a large production of anthracite pig-and rolled iron." When duties on imported iron were significantly reduced in the mid-1840s, Swank (1897, p. 86) noted the "paralyzing effect" it had on the industry. Alternatively, Grosvenor (1871, p. 25) concluded that "No one who attentively considers the record of our foreign trade will fail to observe that the influence of changes of tariff, either to check or to stimulate importations, has been much less than has commonly been supposed."
In 1912, the AISA changed its name to the American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI). The 2 historical pig iron production data are reproduced in the Census Bureau's Historical Statistics (1975, M-217) . Today, the AISI continues to provide shipments data for the Federal Reserve Board's monthly industrial production index.
As Paskoff (1983, p. 77) notes, "Attempts to ascertain the size of the domestically produced 3 national supply of pig, bar, and rolled iron have not been particularly successful and are clouded with uncertainty. In part, this failure has been due to defects -deliberate and inadvertent -in the reports the iron produces made at various times, but especially in 1832 and 1849." 1840s.
New Estimates of U.S. Iron Production, 1827-1843
This section reviews the existing estimates of early American pig iron production and describes the data and methods used to push these existing series back to 1827. Annual production data for the antebellum period date from the founding the American Iron and Steel Association (AISA) in 1854. From its start, the AISA conducted mail surveys of the nation's forges and foundries in order to determine the quantity of pig iron produced. While these AISA tabulations are viewed as comprehensive and reliable, considerable contention surrounds the reliability of earlier national output estimates that the trade group adopted. Motivated by the 2 absence or shortcomings of contemporary census returns, various organizations periodically undertook the task of estimating national iron production before the AISA's formation.
Unfortunately, the misinterpretation or intentional mishandling of survey data, perhaps because many of these groups had a vested interest in influencing the ongoing tariff data, resulted in vastly different accounts of output before 1854. 3 The first two columns of Table 1 illustrate the extent of the statistical discord. Column 1 is obtained from the AISA's Annual Report (AISI 1918, 9-10) , U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975, The correct 1830 estimate (180,000 gross tons) was amended in the Friends of Domestic 4 Industry pamphlet and is superior to the plagued McLane Report (Paskoff 1989, xxix) .
For a concise series comparison, see Fogel (1964, 154, Column 2 reflect estimates that Temin (1964, 264-65, Grosvenor's (1871) opposing pro-trade estimates (lower bound).
5
This series was originally created as a component to a broader study of early U.S. industrial 6 production in Davis (2004) . However, Davis (2004) did not elaborate on the details of the construction of the early pig iron production series and it is presented here for the first time.
Column 3 presents Fogel's (1964, 151-167, table 5.6 ) reconstructed annual estimates from 1840 through 1853, the period he considers most "wrapped in confusion." Fogel created these estimates by inflating Pennsylvania benchmarks to U.S. levels. Specifically, Fogel estimated the quantity of U.S. pig iron produced for years with missing or dubious figures by fitting a quadratic trend through known U.S.-to-Pennsylvania output ratios, i.e., the observed U.S.-to-Pennsylvania ratios reported for 1839/40 (Sixth Census), 1844 (Home League), 1849/50 (Seventh Census), and for 1854-1856 (AISA surveys, from Lesley (1859, 750) ). Pennsylvania is an appropriate choice because the state was the century's largest producer of pig iron and trade groups periodically conducted surveys of the state's furnaces. Fogel's estimates are valuable in reassessing the controversial picture of national production during the 1840s and have been widely accepted. Many researchers, such as Paskoff (1983) and Calomiris and Hanes (1994) , have merged the Fogel and AISA data to form a continuous U.S. pig iron series from 1840.
The revised production series presented here was also created by employing Fogel's intuitive procedure, with several important modifications. First, because Fogel was only 6 concerned with inflating post-1840 Pennsylvania data, his trend, as illustrated in Figure 1 , turns out to be inaccurate in deriving earlier estimates. The Fogel curve would grossly overstate pre-1840 output since the trend implies a tenuously low Pennsylvania share in the early 1800s. (For example, applying Fogel's trend to Pennsylvania benchmarks generates the counterintuitive result that American iron production in 1810, approximately 300,000 gross tons, roughly equaled that observed in 1840.) Indeed, the pre-1840 Fogel plot contradicts prevailing theories -6-See the previous note concerning the adjustments to the Pennsylvania industry surveys. Bold 7 figures refer to existing estimates from previous surveys or research. Quantities for 1841 , 1844 , 1845 , 1846 , 1847 , 1849 , and 1850 ). Pennsylvania's 1842 estimate is based on a furnace survey conducted by the state's Coal and Iron Association, which held a convention of iron masters in Harrisburg. Since the response rate to the Harrisburg circular was low (only 79 of the 210 known furnaces responded), estimates issued separately by two of the association's members vary, based on the productivity assumptions made for the excluded establishments. Both estimates assume that average productivity at unreturned furnaces was below average, contending that such establishments were of "inferior class" and were often operated on a part-time basis. Childs (1847, 587) placed 1842 output at 194,580 gross tons. Reeves (U.S. Congress, Senate 1849, 809) calculated production at 151,885 tons in a letter to William Meredith. The latter figure has been accepted based on the discussion in Temin (1964, 237-38) and Paskoff (1983, 75, table 20 ; note that Paskoff incorrectly assigns Childs's 1842 Harrisburg estimate to 1840) and should therefore be interpreted as a lower bound for total output. Fogel's implication for 1842 Pennsylvania output is untenable: returned firms alone produced 84,885 gross tons of pig iron that year, and Reeves's lower bound would imply Pennsylvania accounted for two-thirds of U.S. production as expressed by the Carey-Fogel estimate. Pennsylvania counts for 1828 and 1830 originate from surveys conducted by the 1831 Philadelphia convention. According to returned schedules, Pennsylvania pig iron production was 28,515 gross tons in 1828 (24,822 tons pig iron + 3,693 tons of direct castings) and 36,562 gross tons in 1830 (31,056 + 5,506) , as summarized in Childs (1847, 584-85) and Paskoff (1983, 75, table 20 ; note Paskoff's 1830 figure erroneously omits castings). Philadelphia convention members arrived at national estimates (see [2]) for these years by assigning mean output at the unreturned furnaces the average of those returned. This approach, however, significantly understates aggregate Pennsylvania output, as there was an obvious regional bias in completed schedules. Specifically, 44 of the 63 furnaces responding in 1828 and 45 of the 73 in 1830 were located in Pennsylvania, while a disproportionate number of unreturned circulars pertained to more distant establishments, who presumably did not make the longer trip to Philadelphia (Smith 1847; Paskoff 1983 ). This hypothesis is bolstered by the fact that the 19 out-of-state returns in 1828 were predominantly located in nearby states (11 in New Jersey; 5 in Maryland; 2 in Virginia; and 1 in Delaware). The convention noted that of the 129 furnaces unreturned in 1830, many were located in states completely un-represented in the survey, including all of New England, Tennessee, New York and Ohio. These states possessed a significant number of charcoal furnaces. While the over-representation of Pennsylvania firms in the Philadelphia survey does not affect the national totals, it surely biases downward the share of output attributable to Pennsylvania (PA output was not inflated by the committee). Failing to account for this survey bias would lead to a spuriously low PA-to-US trend (see Figure 1 ) and would thus overstate U.S. iron output during the 1830s. An attempt to correct for this regional response bias concerning the spatial and technological developments in the early iron industry.
Consequently, Fogel's inflation curve has been recalculated by incorporating pre-1840 Pennsylvania output shares. The revised trend in Figure 1 displays a more consistent, muted U-7 is made by accessing additional data on furnace counts at the state level as a mechanism to properly inflate Pennsylvania output in 1828 and 1830. The number of operational furnaces was compiled from information in Lesley (1859) , Smith (1851) , "Documents" (1851), Swank (1878 Swank ( , 1892 , Bining ([1938 ] 1973 ), and Paskoff (1983 . Pennsylvania output was then imputed from the underlying weighted average of Pennsylvania and out-of-state returns, adjusted to reflect the number of additional unreturned Pennsylvania furnaces in the inflated totals. Pennsylvania's revised output share was checked against non-Pennsylvania furnace data from existing case studies and federal and state censuses. The procedure appropriately revises downward the survey's share of Pennsylvania furnaces in 1828 from 70 percent (reported, unadjusted, noninflated) to 36 percent (adjusted, inflated). The latter share is more consistent with the ratio of Pennsylvania iron furnaces reported in the broader 1810, 1832, and 1840 national canvasses. The revised state furnace shares were subsequently used to arrive at Pennsylvania estimates in [4] based on the 1828 and 1830 U.S. estimates discussed in [2]. Note that changes in Pennsylvania output between 1828 and 1830 accord well with increases in new charcoal furnace capacity constructed in the state over this period (Smith 1851) . Non-bold state figures have been interpolated on pig iron shipments descending from the Lehigh and Schuylkill iron districts, home to the major anthracite coal deposits in eastern Pennsylvania.
The deficiencies in the 1810 manufacturing survey have been well documented, most cogently 8 by Fishbein (1963) . While evidence exists that iron returns outside of Pennsylvania were erroneously tabulated, the Pennsylvania iron industry also voiced considerable dissatisfaction with the deficiencies in the reported state totals. By incorporating Pennsylvania's returned 1810 share (49.9%, see Coxe (1814) ) in the calculations, the census bias is assumed to be distributed symmetrically between Pennsylvania and all other iron-producing states. That said, the final results are resilient to changes in the 1810 observation because trend values before 1827 are discarded.
shape, yet closely resembles Fogel's curve after 1840. There are compelling reasons why the revised (quadratic) trend shown in Figure 1 should be more accurate. While Pennsylvania accounted for roughly one-half of domestic output around 1810, American iron production was nevertheless decentralized insofar as most states had charcoal iron forges to meet local blacksmithing demand. Scholars on the pre-Civil War iron industry, most notably Bruce 8 ([1931] 1967), Warren (1973) , Paskoff (1983) , and Knowles and Healey (2006) , have noted that iron production was spatially diversified in the 1820s and early 1830s on account of accentuated frontier development. The combination of high transportation costs and a reliance on blastfurnace technology, meanwhile, hampered Pennsylvania furnaces from reliably serving distant Auxiliary data in Lesley (1859) , Grosvenor (1871, 192) , and Paskoff (1983) support this claim.
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Records of charcoal-furnace construction indicate that new Pennsylvania iron capacity lagged additions elsewhere until the mid-1830s. Temin (1964, 240-41) argues that Pennsylvania's iron industry lost market share throughout the 1820s to more rapidly growing states.
Confidence in the revised curve in Figure 1 is bolstered by several factors. First, the new ratio curve implies that Pennsylvania began to regain market share by the mid-1830s with the emergence of anthracite coal as an alternative smelting fuel. The relationship between Pennsylvania's market share and the share of pig iron produced with non-conventional fuels is documented in Table 2 . Following the development of the hot blast, anthracite rapidly replaced charcoal as the primary mineral fuel in eastern Pennsylvania blast furnaces. Since anthracite deposits were highly concentrated in eastern Pennsylvania, Temin (1964, 241) argues "the rising proportion of mineral fuel production can account for the change in the proportion of production made in Pennsylvania." Concomitant transportation improvements (canals, railroads) only further facilitated non-local consumption of Pennsylvania iron.
To arrive at pre-1840 totals, the revised Pennsylvania-to-national trend from Figure 1was multiplied to an extended annual series on Pennsylvania pig iron production (Table 1, [5] are negligible. However, the revised estimates from 1845-48 validate Fogel's (1964, 163) concern that his figures for those years "may be low. Harrisburg convention is in itself evidence that production was depressed. This is a valid point, but depressed since when? Iron masters certainly must have been concerned that 1841 production had fallen more than one-third below the levels attained before the late 1830s. More compelling quantitative evidence points to a rebound in the iron industry by 1842 in lockstep with other broad sectors of the U.S. economy. More anecdotally, contemporary observers talked of forges increasing supply in anticipation of improved market conditions following the enactment of the tariff on imported iron (Grosvenor 1871; Paskoff 1989, xvii ).
Yet perhaps the most convincing reason why the Fogel-Carey estimate is untenable is that it implies Pennsylvania accounted for nearly two-thirds of U.S output in 1842 but only onethird the previous year. This change is implausible. 
Foreign Competition and the Antebellum U.S. Iron Industry
The development of the pre-Civil War iron industry and the role of foreign competition can best be understood by examining data on domestic production, imports, and tariff rates.
While data on imports are readily available, compiling them is not a straightforward matter. The volume (by weight) of imports of iron products -encompassing pig iron and bar iron, either hammered or rolled -is available in the Secretary of the Treasury's annual Report on Commerce and Navigation. A broad definition of imports is required because a simple comparison of domestic-and foreign-produced pig iron would give a misleading view of foreign competition in the domestic market. Imported bar iron, either hammered or rolled, is a close substitute for domestically-produced pig iron; for example, if the United States imposed higher duties on imported pig iron, consumers could respond by purchasing more foreign-produced bar iron instead. All domestically-produced bar iron, however, originated either from domestic or imported pig iron.
Therefore, domestic pig iron production should be compared with effective imports of pig iron, consisting of both pig and bar iron. To do so, the import data have been adjusted in two ways. First, various sources suggest that 1.25 tons of pig iron were required to make one ton of bar iron (Engerman 1971, p. 15) . Therefore, the weight of bar iron imports is multiplied by 1.25 and added to imports of pig iron to arrive at total effective imports of pig iron (what Engerman calls pig iron equivalents). Second, the import data are reported on a fiscal year basis (October to September), whereas domestic production is reported for the calendar year. Therefore, the import data are adjusted to match the production data more closely. Thus, imports in the shows that fluctuations in production and imports after 1840 were particularly pronounced.
Significant changes in tariff policy were also an important feature of this period. In 1842, import One complication is that duties collected on imports of rolled iron for railroads -a component 13 of rolled iron -were rebated between 1831 and 1843. The value of these rebates is presented in U.S. Treasury (1857, pp. 8-9) and is deducted from the total tariff revenue collected on rolled iron imports to arrive at the effective tariff. The domestic iron industry did not have, and did not seem interested in developing, the capacity to meet the growing demand for rails. Railroads lobbied strenuously to exempt rail imports from the tariff. The tariff of 1830 granted them a rebate on the duties paid and the tariff of 1832 made railroad iron duty free. This exemption was revoked with the tariff of 1842. See Fishlow (1965), pp. 133-134. duties were raised significantly, and production of pig iron more than doubled between 1841 and 1847. Imports did not increase during this period, but rose rapidly after the 1846 Walker tariff reduced duties on imported iron. From this point, domestic production collapsed, falling 46 percent from 1847 to 1851, such that the volume of imports actually exceeded domestic production in 1851 and 1852. Production then rebounded with imports continuing to increase until 1853, after which they trailed off.
Because these fluctuations in production and imports are often associated with changes in the tariff, the average tariff on imported iron must be calculated. Table 3 presents the actual tariffs for the three classification of goods: pig iron and bar iron, hammered and rolled. Figure 4 presents the average ad valorem tariff on effective pig iron imports, which is an import valueweighted average of the tariffs on the three import categories. The ad valorem equivalents of the specific duties are calculated by dividing the duty by the item's average price, which is approximated by the unit value, i.e., by dividing the value of imports by their weight. By this 13 measure, the average tariff moved between 30 percent and 60 percent in the 1830s, until lower import prices and the Tariff Act of 1842 briefly pushed it up to nearly 70 percent. After 1844, higher import prices eroded the ad valorem equivalent of the specific duties to such an extent that the Walker tariff of 1846 (effective in December of that year) reduced the effective tariff on pig iron from just 43 percent in 1846 to 30 percent in 1847. Wallis (2001) notes that the Crisis of 1839 was a greater shock than the more famous Panic of 14 1837 because it ushered in a four year period of deflation and depression. As Temin (1964, p. 21) writes, output was initially flat and then declined output during the years 1837 to 1841 due to "the general depression in American business conditions that followed the boom years of the previous decade." However, tariffs appear to be much less important than import prices in influencing the cyclical pattern of U.S. output. As shown in Figure 5 , the slight rise in the price of imported iron goods through the 1830s coincides with the expansion of U.S. production. In the early 1840s, however, import prices fell sharply and domestic producers suffered from the nationwide economic downturn as well. The tariff of 1842 muted the fall in import prices, as Figure 5   14 illustrates, but did not prevent it. Sharply higher import prices after 1844 pushed domestic production to record high levels, but the collapse of those prices after 1847 completely erased the increase in output during the early 1840s and led to the dramatic surge in imports.
The tariff reduction in December 1846 had little immediate impact on producers because domestic prices rose through 1847 as demand continued to expand. The AISA reported that "the last half of 1847 and the first part of 1848" was the period of "greatest production" (Fogel 1964, p. 160) . The collapse in prices was only slightly exacerbated by the Walker tariff reduction itself, although the shift to an ad valorem tariff, instead of a specific duty, as we shall see, deprived the industry of a great deal of protection. Domestic production did not recover until 1852 when import prices started rising again.
The factors affecting the U.S. iron industry after 1840 are intimately related to developments in Britain, the source of the overwhelming majority of U.S. imports of iron goods. Import prices were the key mechanism by which changes in the British iron market were transmitted to the United States and affected American production, a point is stressed by
The domestic price of pig iron fell 29 percent between 1847 and 1851; U.S. Bureau of the 15 Census (1975) , series M 218. Engerman (1971) . For example, the British railway investment boom in mid-1840s led to a significant increase in iron prices in both countries (Kenwood 1965) . A commercial crisis at the end of 1847 in Britain ended the speculative boom and led to a four year decline in prices (Boot 1984, Gayer, Rostow, and Schwartz 1953) . U.S. production surged during the British boom, but collapsed with the steep drop in British export prices. Specie flowed from the United States to Britain and U.S. interest rates soared: the rate on short-term commercial paper climbed from 4.7 percent in 1845 to 15.1 percent in 1848 (Historical Statistics 2006, Cj1223).
U.S. producers blamed British "dumping" of iron in the U.S. market and the Walker tariff reduction for the distress after 1847. A group of iron producers assembled in Pittsburgh in August 1849 declared that "the present depressed state of the iron trade has its origin and is entirely caused by the low rate of duty at which English iron is admitted to this country" (Eiselen 1932, 221) . But the "dumping" was due to the adverse demand shock in Britain rather than a targeted effort to harm American producers through price discrimination: the price of pig iron in Britain fell 39 percent between 1847 and 1851, while the U.S. import price of pig iron fell 37 percent over the same period (Mitchell 1988, p. 763 ; Figure 3) . Although the U.S. economy 15 recovered quickly from the British financial disturbance in 1847-48, the iron industry took much longer to rebound. Relief finally came in 1853 when the Crimean War diverted British iron production to domestic uses, thereby driving up export prices and reducing exports to the United States.
These import price shocks force many adjustments upon the American iron industry, part of which was accomplished by the entry and exit of firms. As Table 4 shows, the pattern of firm Fogel and Engerman (1969) also examined the determinants of output growth of the 16 antebellum iron industry, but as Joskow and McKelvey (1971) noted, their model is not clearly identified. entry and failure is closely related to the cyclical developments just discussed. From 1844 to 1846, high prices triggered the construction of many new iron furnaces. When import prices reversed themselves starting in 1847, many firms ceased production, either temporarily or permanently, or were sold.
Thus, the presence of a substantial import tariff did not prevent U.S. iron producers from feeling the effects of a high degree of integration with the British market. Domestic pig iron producers came under severe stress in the late 1840s largely because of intensified foreign competition and tariff changes. The key issue is untangling these various factors to determine their relative contribution to changes in domestic production.
Explaining Fluctuations in American Iron Production
The availability of the longer series on U.S. pig iron production presented in section 2 enables us to disentangle the various factors -domestic economic activity, import competition, and tariff protection -in promoting or retarding the growth of the domestic industry. The relative contribution of these factors can be assessed in a simple reduced-form partial equilibrium model that can be estimated using the existing data for this period.
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The framework used here is largely based on Grossman (1986) and treats domestic and foreign pig iron as imperfect substitutes for one another, as is frequently assumed even in contemporary models of the iron and steel industry. Suppressing the time subscripts, the domestic supply of pig iron is specified as:
Regrettably, data on other inputs, such as the price of iron ore, are not readily available. The coefficient å captures the impact of cost shocks, in this case the price of anthracite coal, which was the most common source of fuel used by the end of sample.
17
The demand for domestically-produced pig iron is specified as:
which indicates that the quantity demanded depends upon the relative price of domestic pig iron CPI CPI (p/p ), the tariff-inclusive relative price of imported iron (p*[1+ô]/p , where p* is the foreign price and ô is the ad valorem tariff), and U.S. industrial production. Industrial production (excluding of iron itself) is the relevant demand-shifting variable, rather than a broader measure such as gross domestic product, because pig iron is not a final consumer good but a raw material 1 used mainly in the production of other industrial goods. The coefficient ç is the own-price 23 elasticity of demand, ç is the cross-price elasticity of demand, and ç is the elasticity of demand with respect to industrial production.
The key relationship of interest is the responsiveness of domestic supply to changes in the price of imported iron. Domestic supply is affected indirectly by the price of imported iron through its impact on the demand for domestic iron. The closer substitutes that domestic and foreign iron are in demand, the greater the sensitivity of supply to the price of imports. The price
The ARDL approach has been revived recently in comparison to other dynamic specifications, 18 such as error-correction mechanisms. See, for example, Gerrard and Godfrey (1998) and Shin (1998). In the simplest ARDL specification takes the form: y = â x + â x + á y + tt t 1 2 u , where the long-run impact of x on y is given by è = (â + â )/(1-á). Pesaran and Shin (p. 372) note that "the traditional ARDL approach justified in the case of trend-stationary regressors is in fact equally valid even if the regressors are first-difference stationary." of imported iron alone is a sufficient measure of foreign competition because it is plausibly exogenous; see Grossman (1986) for a discussion of this point. For example, exports of iron products to the United States accounted for about 7 percent of British iron production, and thus U.S. demand was a relatively small part of total British iron output (Mitchell 1988, 281, 300) .
By contrast, the volume of imports is clearly endogenous and depends upon domestic supply and demand factors, as well as on foreign market conditions. Therefore, solving the domestic demand equation for the relative price of domestic pig DS iron and substituting it into the domestic supply equation, while noting that x = x in equilibrium, we obtain the following reduced-form equation:
The elasticity of domestic production with respect to the relative price of imports (ã ) is a function of the elasticity of supply and the own-and cross-price elasticities of demand. This coefficient should be positive, implying that domestic production is positively related to the 1 1 2 112 1 relative price of imported iron goods, because ã = -åç/ç, and å > 0, ç > 0, and ç < 0. (3) are presented in column (1), but this specification ignores all the dynamics in the data and consequently the results are marred by serial correlation. To address these issues, column (2) estimates a simple autoregressive distributed lag model (ARDL) of the same equation. In
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This elasticity is remarkably close to the cross-price elasticity of demand with respect to 19 import prices (-1.67) estimated by Fogel and Engerman (1969) using different data and different methods. Note, however, that we estimate a supply responsiveness while they are estimating a demand responsiveness parameter.
comparison with the column (1) result, the column (2) ARDL results show a better fit, lower regression standard error, and the absence of serial correlation.
The column (2) results indicated that the long-run elasticity of domestic output with respect to relative import prices is 1.49. The elasticity of output with respect to import prices is remarkably high, implying that a 10 percent increase in import prices will increase domestic production by about 15 percent. Not every antebellum industry is so sensitive to import 19 competition. For example, Irwin and Temin (2001) found that domestic production of cotton textiles in the antebellum period was not very sensitive to changes in import prices. The importance of product differentiation in the textile industry may explain the lower degree of sensitivity to import competition in comparison to the pig iron industry, where the product is more homogeneous. The long-run impact of industrial production on pig iron output is 1.17, indicating that iron output was also quite responsive to the general expansion of industry.
With the aid of these estimates, the impact of the Walker tariff and the import price decline on domestic production can be determined . According to Figure 4 , by 1845 the specific duties in the tariff of 1842 had been eroded by higher import prices, so the Walker tariff act amounted to a reduction in the average applied tariff from 43 percent in 1846 to 30 percent in 1847. By itself, this would reduce the relative price of imports by 9 percent, calculated as 1847 1846
(1+ô )/(1+ô )-1. A 9 percent reduction in the relative price of imports would reduce domestic production by about 13 percent, equivalent to nearly 100,000 tons of 1847 production.
A contemporary estimate held that "had the tariff of 1842 remained unchanged, the produce of this year would have been greater than that of 1847 by at least 200,000 tons" ("The Tariff of 1846," 4). While this appears to be an exaggeration, the tariff reduction still brought about a significant loss of output by the industry.
By contrast, import prices (exclusive of the tariff) fell 39 percent between 1846 and 1851, which would translate into an output decline of about 58 percent, or 444,000 tons. Overall U.S.
industrial production grew 4.5 percent over this period, providing a modest offset in the face of falling prices. Domestic production of pig iron actually fell 46 percent between 1847 and 1851, so it appears that much of this can be explained by the decline in the relative price of imports due to the lower tariff and lower import prices. (The measures above overstate their role in reducing output because they are not relative to changes in the consumer price index.) Nevertheless, the decline in import prices was roughly four times more important than the tariff reduction of 1846.
However, had the specific duties of the 1842 tariff remained in effect, the ad valorem Therefore, by this calculation, nearly half of domestic iron output was dependent upon the tariff for its existence. However, this conclusion is not independent of the tariff level. For example, the abolition of the 30 percent ad valorem tariff after 1847 and before 1857 would have reduced the relative price of imports by 23 percent, resulting in a 34 percent decline in domestic production. As a general statement, these results suggest that domestic production would have declined by about one-third to one-half in the absence of the tariff.
To summarize, domestic production of pig iron was highly sensitive to changes in import prices in the antebellum period. Import prices were subject to large swings as cyclical fluctuations in Britain were transmitted to the United States. Although the decline in domestic output during the late 1840s and early 1850s was more due to a fall in British export prices than to the Walker tariff reduction. Our conclusion about the tariff is very similar to Temin's (1964, p. 23) , who thought it "doubtful" that changes in import duties was the major factor driving changes in domestic production. However, even though the large reduction in domestic output would have taken place even if import duties had not been reduced in 1846, the tariff reduction in that year still constituted an extremely severe shock nonetheless.
We conclude with two related points, one relating to the relationship between the tariff and technological change in pig iron production, and the other to the relationship between pig iron producers and the broader iron and steel industry. Grosvenor (1871) and Taussig (1931) argued that an undesirable consequence of the tariff of 1842 was that it perpetuated the use of the less efficient charcoal furnaces, which were destined to be displaced by anthracite coal furnaces.
As Taussig (1931, p. 133 ) put it, "Charcoal iron for general use was a thing of the past; the Thus, Taussig (p. 134) argued that tariffs "retarded for the United States that cheapening of 20 iron which has been one of the most important factors in the march of improvement in this century, and maintained in existence costly charcoal furnaces long after that method had ceased in Great Britain to be in general use." Grosvenor (1871, pp. 219-220) argues: "Was it well for the country, then, that Pennsylvania 21 was paid, at public cost, for erecting so large a number of furnaces destined surely to be closed and abandoned whenever the use of anthracite became more general? Pointing to the wrecks scattered over Pennsylvania, where millions of money were lost by men who were tempted by the tariff of 1842 into the making of iron at the public expense, the advocate of protection asks whether the country did not lose by the destruction of these works. It did lose, not by their destruction, but by their establishment. It lost by the investment of large sums of money and much energy and enterprise in a wasteful instead of profitable manner." effect of the tariff of 1842 was to call into existence a number of furnaces which used antiquated methods, and before long must have been displaced in any even by anthracite furnaces. " While   20 there is evidence to support this claim, the tariff was just one factor at work here. Because charcoal furnaces were smaller and less expensive to construct than anthracite furnaces, Paskoff (1983, p. 131) notes that their construction "entailed a level of capitalization well within reach of an individual or small partnership and did not require the formation of a company." As a result, higher iron prices in early 1840s -due only in part to the higher tariff -prompted the entry of many small charcoal furnaces that would be unable to survive if prices fell. Finally, although the focus of this paper has been on how import tariffs promoted greater production by domestic pig iron producers, there is no presumption that such a policy should have been the goal of government policy. This paper has not conducted a cost-benefit analysis of the protection given to pig iron producers, and in fact the domestic iron industry was sharply divided over the merits of high tariffs on imported iron. As Paskoff (1983, p. 76) notes, by the early 1820s the American iron industry had matured into two distinct branches: pig and bar iron producers who made the raw material for iron manufacturers, who made pots, stoves, beams and structures, rails, nails, and other products. Iron manufacturers had an interest in obtaining inexpensive pig iron, which led them to oppose protection for pig iron producers. As Paskoff (1983, p. 76) writes: "For producers, no amount of protection from imported British iron could ever be too much protection; for the manufacturers, who purchased foreign as well as domestic pig and bar iron, rates in excess of pro forma levels were an 'excessive burden.' In a series of memorials and petitions to Congress between 1820 and 1850 each of the two increasingly antagonistic branches of the industry attempted to persuade the House and Senate of the wisdom, justice, and public-spiritedness of its position and of the base and groundless character of its opposition, which had only its own interests, and not those of the nation, at heart.
Conclusions
This paper has presented a new data series on early U.S. pig iron production and has pushed back existing estimates to 1827. This series was then used with a new compilation of imports and import prices to determine the importance of foreign competition and the tariff in affecting domestic output. Domestic iron production is found to be highly sensitive to import price fluctuations. This sensitivity may account for the strong protectionist sentiment in Schallenberg (1975) , Swank (1878 Swank ( , 1892 , and Temin (1964, 266-7, Data Sources: Domestic production: see note to Figure 1 . Price of imports: unit value of imports, as described in the text. Average tariff: see Figure 2 , as described in text. Industrial production: from Davis (2004) ; however, it has been purged of pig iron production, which receives a weight of 0.082 in the index. It was purged by calculating the index without pig iron, i.e., (1/0.918)*(IP -0.082*Pig Iron). The price of coal: the U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975) , series E-129. Consumer price index: David and Solar (1976) . 
